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Abstract
We study the joint dynamics of economic and political change.
Predictions of the simple model that we formulate in the paper get
considerable support in a panel of data on political regimes and GDP
per capita for about 150 countries over 150 years. Democratic cap-
ital — measured by a nation’s historical experience with democracy
and by the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood — reduces the
exit rate from democracy and raises the exit rate from autocracy. In
democracies, a higher stock of democratic capital stimulates growth
in an indirect way by decreasing the probability of a sucessful coup.
Our results suggest a virtuous circle, where the accumulation of phys-
ical and democratic capital reinforce each other, promoting economic
development jointly with the consolidation of democracy.
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In the past two hundred years, the world has undergone a dramatic economic
change. While a number of countries have seen unprecedented developments
of their living standards, many countries in the third world remain poor.
Among societies with sustained economic growth, takeoﬀs occur at very dif-
ferent points in time: while many European countries have been growing for
100-150 years, the experience with solid growth is much more recent in Asia
or Latin America, and yet not widely experienced in Africa. Moreover, the
within-country variation is typically large, with periods of fast growth often
followed by periods of stagnation — the stable 2% growth of income per capita
enjoyed by the US is more of an exception than a rule.
During the same time, we have seen equally dramatic political changes.
Many countries have become more or less solid democracies, but close to
a half of all independent states remain autocracies. Democratizations — like
growth takeoﬀs — are dispersed over time. As observed by Huntington (1991),
at least three clearly discernible waves of democratization have swept the
world since the early 19th century, although the ﬁrst wave almost spanss
a 100 years, with democracy arriving early in the US and late in Sweden.
Further, as in the case of economic development, political development in
some countries has been volatile, with nations such as Argentina and Spain
living through intermittent periods of democracy and autocracy.
At some level, these rich dynamics of economic and political change have
to be connected. Both a priori reasoning and casual observation lead us to
expect a two-way interaction, with stable democracy promoting the pace of
economic development, and economic development promoting the consoli-
dation of democracy. Yet, our theoretical and empirical understanding of
such dynamic interactions is seriously incomplete. Research following Lipset
(1959) indeed suggests a positive eﬀect of the level of development on the
maintenance of democracy. This evidence largely exploits the variation of
income levels across countries at a given point in time, however. The within-
country evidence that sustained growth promotes democracy is much weaker.
Similarly, researchers seeking to establish a systematic link in the other di-
rection — from democracy to income and growth — have come up with mixed
results: some studies claim that democracy creates faster growth while others
ﬁnd no robust link. Some of the recent literature on these topics is brieﬂy
reviewed in Section 2 below.
This paper revisits the dynamic interaction between political and eco-
2nomic change, building on two ideas. The ﬁrst idea concerns the economic
eﬀects of democracy. If democracy inﬂuences economic performance, this
must largely happen via investment decisions and hence through expecta-
tions. The prospects of future democracy then becomes a crucial determi-
nant of current economic performance. This means that, to correctly assess
the economic consequences of democracy, we must look beyond the current
regime, to expectations about its stability. However simple, this insight is
often overlooked in existing empirical studies. We show that omission is
partly responsible for giving democracy a worse reputation than it deserves.
When expectations of regime stability are taken into account, democracies —
on average — grow faster than autocracies.
This provokes the question of what makes democracies more or less sta-
ble, which is where our second idea comes in. Consolidation of democracy
requires that citizens learn to cherish and respect democracy as a method
of government. A common perception of democracy as a valuable form of
government will not pop up overnight, or in a vacuum. Rather, a gradual
appreciation of democracy can be envisaged as an accumulation of a stock of
civic and social assets that takes place through a country’s learning from its
own historical experience or from its neighboring countries. We refer to this
consolidation process as the accumulation of "democratic capital".
A combination of these two ideas suggests rich dynamic interactions be-
tween economic and political change, including a positive feedback loop be-
tween democracy and economic development. As democracy consolidates
and becomes more stable, income grows more rapidly. This feeds into more
democratic stability, and yet more economic growth. At the same time, ac-
cumulation of democratic capital brings about yet more stability and further
growth. Countries ruled by autocrats, instead, are more likely to stagnate
because they do not have any chance of initiating this virtuous circle of con-
solidation and growth. If they happen to become democracies, they remain
vulnerable and unstable until they have accumulated enough democratic cap-
ital. As instability hurts economic development, it feeds into itself.
The paper tries to take these ideas to the data, building on two method-
ological postulates. First, to interpret complicated two-way interactions be-
tween political and economic change, we need an explicit theoretical frame-
work. To that end, Section 3 lays out an overlapping-generations model
of economic and political change. Sustained economic growth is driven by
investment, which depends on expected returns. If productivity is higher
in democratic than autocratic regimes, growth in democracies is negatively
3aﬀected by the probability of regime change. The probability of a regime
change is determined in a global game, where individual citizens decide
whether to participate in defending democracy (or overthrowing a dicta-
tor). This decision reﬂects society’s endowment of democratic capital. In
equilibrium, higher democratic capital implies a lower probability of autoc-
racy in the future. Therefore, more democratic capital has no direct eﬀect
on growth, only a positive indirect eﬀect via higher expected returns (and
investments). These predictions, as well as other implications of the model,
suggest how to approach the data.
Our second methodological postulate is that understanding the rich dy-
namics of economic and political change requires a very long time horizon,
even if that comes at the cost of data availability. To that end, we con-
struct an unbalanced panel with annual data for about 150 countries and
150 years, exploiting the data sets on GDP per capita assembled by An-
gus Maddison and the data on political regimes assembled in the Polity IV
project. These data are discussed in Section 4, where we also describe how
to give operational contents to the concept of democratic capital. We pos-
tulate that democratic capital has two components: one domestic and one
foreign. Domestic democratic capital depends on the country’s own histori-
cal experience: it accumulates in periods of democracy and decumulates in
periods of autocracy. Foreign democratic capital depends on current experi-
ence elsewhere: it accumulates with the incidence of democracy abroad and
decumulates with the incidence of autocracy in other countries, with weights
depending on geographic distance.
Many of the key predictions of our simple model hold up when confronted
with the data. In Section 5, we present and discuss the empirical results on
political transitions. Our maximum-likelihood estimates show that demo-
cratic capital indeed explains the probability of exit from democracy: the
hazard rate out of democratic regimes goes down with both components of
democratic capital, as well as with the level of real income. Similarly, the
hazard rate out of autocracy increases in both components of democratic
capital, but — interestingly — does not depend on income.
In Section 6, we proceed to economic growth. To isolate the eﬀect of ex-
pected regime changes, we ﬁrst consider each political regime in isolation and
rely on the hazard rates estimated in Section 5. Exploiting only the within-
country variation in the data, we ﬁnd that the estimated hazard rate out
of democracy indeed reduces economic growth, as predicted by our theory.
The risk of exit from autocracies also appears to hurt economic growth, how-
4ever, contrary to the predictions of the theory. This second empirical result
is less robust, but suggests that economic growth may be hurt by political
instability (rather than by the nature of the regime transition).
We then jointly consider actual and expected regime changes. Not only
are more stable democracies associated with faster growth, but the estimated
eﬀect of actual democracy becomes stronger when we hold constant the prob-
ability of regime change. While these results can be given a structural inter-
pretation in terms of our theory, they hinge on quite restrictive identifying
assumptions. Therefore, we end with a less demanding exercise, namely to es-
timate the reduced-form growth equation suggested by our model. Although
we cannot distinguish the eﬀects running through actual vs. expected regime
changes, we ﬁnd that democratic capital is unambiguously good for growth.
The results are not only statistically robust but also quantitatively impor-
tant. Consistently with the within-regime estimates, the positive eﬀect of
democratic capital on growth is only present in democracies. A higher stock
of democratic capital makes autocracies more likely to fall, but this eﬀect is
not conducive to faster growth as long as the regime remains autocratic.
2 Related literature
A vast empirical literature has studied the link between democracy and
growth on the one hand, and the determinants of democracy on the other,
although these two issues have often been studied separately. Przeworski
et al. (2000) and De Mesquita et al. (2003) are among the few systematic
studies that addresses both issues together. The comprehensive study by
Przeworski et al is mainly conﬁned to the postwar period, yet the main em-
pirical results are largely consistent with the results presented in this paper,
although the details of the analysis and the identifying assumptions diﬀer
from our own. In particular, they conclude that higher income increases the
survival of democracy, but has no eﬀect on the survival of autocracy, that
a history of democratic instability helps predict regime transitions, and the
international political climate has an impact on the stability of democracy.
This is in line with our ﬁndings on the eﬀect of domestic and foreign de-
mocratic capital on regime transitions. On the reverse link, from political
regime to growth, the main conclusion of Przeworski et al is that political in-
stability (i.e., by the prediction of regime change) hurts growth, particularly
under autocracy.
5How economic development and other variables determine the onset, or
the survival of, democracy is the subject of many books and articles. Among
the most recent contributions, Boix (2003) focuses on the redistributive
consequences of alternative political regimes, while Barro (1999), Boix and
Stokes (2003), Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2005a and b) and
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2005) discuss the eﬀect of economic devel-
opment and education on democracy, reaching diﬀerent conclusions. These
studies mainly focus on the postwar period and do not focus on variables
similar to our notion of democratic capital (see Section 5 for more discussion
and a comparison with our results).
We are not the ﬁrst to stress the importance of civic engagement and cul-
tural attitudes in shaping the functioning of political institutions, and how
some kind of "social capital" can slowly be acquired over time under spe-
ciﬁc political institutions. Important precursors include Almond and Verba
(1963), Lipset (1959) and more recently Putnam (1993), Inglehart and Welzel
(2005) and Hadenius and Teorell (2005). But our empirical methodology is
very diﬀerent from these studies. In particular, our notion of democratic
capital refers to variables that inﬂuence the stability of democratic regimes,
but have no direct eﬀects on economic outcomes. The importance of culture
in economic (as opposed to political) development is discussed more at length
and with a diﬀerent methodology in Tabellini (2005).
Several political scientists have discussed the role of masses vs. elites in
regime transitions — see, in particular, Collier (1999), Geddes (1999), and
Bermeo (2003). Opp (1999) and Gibson (1997) rely on survey data to doc-
ument how citizens’ decisions to participate in the uprise against socialist
autocracies at the turn of the 1990s was motivated by strategic and social
considerations, similar to those discussed in our theoretical model in Section
3.
How democracy — or political regimes, more generally — shape economic
development, is the subject of an equally large literature. Here, the ﬁndings
are, essentially, all over the place. Barro (1996), Helliwell (1994), Londregan
and Poole (1990), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), and Mulligan and Sala-
I-Martin (2004) mainly exploit cross-country variation or pooled time-series
and cross-country data for the post-war period, and ﬁnd no robust eﬀect of
democracy on economic growth. On the other hand, Roll and Talbott (2003),
Jones and Olken (2005), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2004), Giavazzi and
Tabellini (2005) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) focus on within-country
variation and their ﬁndings are generally more supportive of a positive aver-
6age eﬀect of democracy on economic outcomes (with relevant heterogeneity
amongst episodes of democratization, however).
These papers do not consider whether regime transitions were expected or
unexpected, however. An exception is Londregan and Poole (1990), who at-
tempt to estimate the eﬀect of political instability and ﬁnd no evidence that
growth is aﬀected by past coups or current coup propensity. Finally, and im-
portantly, Gerring, Bond, Barndt and Moreno (2005) show that democratic
history (besides the current regime) has an eﬀect on economic performance.
While these authors do not provide the same economic interpretation as we
do, their empirical results are consistent with our reduced-form results.
3 A model of political and economic change
In this section, we formulate a model of political regime transitions and eco-
nomic growth. At ﬁrst sight, this model may appear simple, maybe even
simplistic. But our goal is not theory for its own sake. We use the theory to
guide our empirical investigation on historical panel data going back to the
mid 1800s. Except for some ﬁxed country characteristics, these data only
include time-varying observations of income per capita, called yt below, and
the political regime, called at below. Such sparsity of data calls for a very
parsimonious model. The role of this model is to formulate testable hypothe-
ses to confront with the data, and derive a consistent set of identiﬁcation and
speciﬁcation assumptions.
3.1 The economic model
Consider a standard overlapping generations economy with a continuum of
members in each generation. Aggregate production per worker in period t is
given by the neoclassical production function on intensive form:
yt = A(at)f(kt) , (1)
where kt is capital per worker, f is a concave function such that fk(0) → ∞,
and A denotes total factor productivity (TFP). We allow the level of TFP
to diﬀer between democracy, denoted by at = 0, and autocracy, denoted
by at = 1 (see further below). To simplify the algebra, we set A(0) =
1 + α and A(1) = 1. This gives gross factor rewards rt = A(at)fk(kt) and
wt = A(at)(f(kt) − fk(kt)kt). We abstract from population growth. Note
7that, conditional on the political regime, TFP remains constant over time.
Diﬀerences in TFP across political regimes could reﬂect economic policy
priorities which are left implicit here. Throughout most of the section, we let
α ⋚ 0, leaving open which regime is associated with better economic policies
in a particular country and time period.
The young in period t−1 have quasi-linear preferences over consumption
when young and old. They choose their savings, in the form of capital kt, so
as to maximize their expected utility from economic outcomes:
Et−1(vt) = V (wt−1 − kt) + Et−1[rtkt] , (2)
where V is a concave function and Vc(0) → ∞.
3.2 Timing and behavior in each period
There are three state variables at the beginning of period t, namely (i) kt, the
per worker capital stock accumulated in period t − 1, at−1, (ii) the political
regime at the end of the previous period: 0 (1) if t − 1 ended in democracy
(autocracy), and (iii) dt−1, democratic capital accumulated up to the previous
period (see further below). In a given time period, which starts oﬀ in a
democratic (autocratic) regime, the timing is as follows
(1) An attempted coup against democracy takes place with probability
χ(0) (an uprise against autocracy happens with probability χ(1)). If it does,
each old makes an individual decision of whether to participate in the de-
fense of (uprise against) the regime, given the perceived costs and beneﬁts of
participation. The young do not participate in the defense (uprise). In the
event of a coup (uprise), the probability that the democratic regime survives
(autocratic regime falls) is equal to st, the proportion of the old population
who participate.
(2) If the coup (uprise) is successful, an autocracy (democracy) is in-
stalled, if not democracy (autocracy) remains. The regime in place cannot
be changed until period t+1 and determines the current value of TFP (A(at)
takes the value 1+α or 1).
(3) Investment decisions for next period, t + 1, are made by each young
individual, based on the returns expected in t + 1.
83.3 Equilibrium political transitions
We now discuss the equilibrium of the game at stage (1), when the period
starts out as a democracy. But the autocratic case is analogous. Let  t be
the true individual cost of participating in the defense (or uprise). This cost
is borne irrespective of whether the coup fails or not. Agent i observes a
noisy signal of this cost:
m
i




t is drawn from a normal distribution. Each agent holds the (im-
proper) prior that  t has a uniform distribution on the real line.
Each old individual perceives a personal "social" beneﬁt, bt, of partici-
pating in a defense of democracy (described below). This personal beneﬁt is
enjoyed only if the defense succeeds. Thus, the expected beneﬁt from par-
ticipation is btst, where st is the probability of success in this defense. Each
individual old agent treats the probability of success as independent of her
own participation. When individual i does not participate, she does not bear
the cost and she gets no social beneﬁt out of the defense. Thus, we normalize
the utility from non-participation to 0.1
In this notation, the net gain from participation in defense of democracy
for individual i as:
E(bt −  t ) = btst − m
i
t .
As already assumed, the probability of a successful defense, st, equals the
share of other old individuals participating in the defense. Then, we have a
global game with incomplete information, which fulﬁlls the conditions A1-
A5 in Morris and Shin (2002, Section 2.2.1). By their results, all individuals
follow an identical strategy σ(mi
t) of participating (σ = 1), or not (σ = 0),










t ≥  ∗
t = bt
2 .
1An individual can gain (or lose) economically as an individual investor if the defense
succeeds. But this individual gain does not determine the decision to participate, because
atomistic individuals treat the probability of success as parametric. Thus, the beneﬁt b is
the preceived social beneﬁt of participating in a successful defense of democracy, not to be
confused with the material economic beneﬁt of actually preventing the coup. This is an
important diﬀerence between pariticipation in a political event and participation in, say, a
speculative attack against a bank or a ﬁxed exchange rate regime; in this latter situation,
participation in a speculative attack also entails direct economic consequences for the
individual investors (which diﬀer depending on whether the attack fails or succeeds).
9This strategy reﬂects a strategic complementarity, but the game neverthe-
less has a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the fraction of old who
participate in the defense of democracy is:
s
∗
t = Prob(ν < bt/2 −  t) ≡ Φ(bt/2 −  t) , (3)
where Φ( ) is the c.d.f. of the normally distributed noise variable ν.
Our goal is to relate political transitions to past political history and the
level of economic development. To achieve this ambitious goal in our simple
model, we assume a beneﬁt bt of participating in a defense of democracy from
two sources. First, the beneﬁt is larger the greater is the perceived value of
living in a democratic society when entering the period. We label this value
"democratic capital", dt−1, and assume that it develops over time in pace with
democratic experience and is inﬂuenced by democratic experience abroad
(this is made more precise when discussing the data in Section 3). Second,
each old individual (altruistically) internalizes the true economic beneﬁt of
being in democracy rather than autocracy on behalf of her fellow group of
old citizens. Given the economic model, this economic welfare diﬀerence is
αfk(kt)kt. The total beneﬁt from the defense of democracy (or the overthrow
of a dictator) is thus:
bt = B(dt−1,kt) = (1 − γ)dt−1 + γαfk(kt)kt , (4)
where (1−γ) is the relative weight on democratic values. This is the personal
social beneﬁt that, via (3), shapes the equilibrium probability of success in
defending democracy.
We can then deﬁne state-dependent hazard rates, i.e., the equilibrium
probability that the country exits from democracy (autocracy) in t, condi-








t,dt−1,at−1] if at−1 = 0
χt(1)Et−1[s∗
t ￿ k∗
t,dt−1,at−1] if at−1 = 1 , (5)
where the expectations operator is taken over the random variable  t, con-
ditional on the state variables dt−1 and at−1 and k∗
t, the (perfectly foreseen)
value of future capital. We then obtain the equilibrium probability of autoc-






t if at−1 = 0
1 − h1∗
t if at−1 = 1 . (6)
10Exploiting equations (3)-(6), the equilibrium probability of autocracy in each
period can be written as a function of the capital stock in place at the be-







The function P( ) is decreasing in democratic capital: Pd < 0. It is increasing
or decreasing in the equilibrium capital stock, k∗
t, depending on whether TFP
is higher or lower in democracy than in autocracy: Pk ⋚ 0 as α   0. Note
that both results hinge on parameter γ being strictly between 0 and 1 in
equation (4). If γ = 1, the perceived beneﬁt of ﬁghting for democracy only
depends on economic well being, and democratic capital does not inﬂuence
the transition probability. Conversely, if γ = 0, the beneﬁt of ﬁghting for
democracy only depends on democratic capital and not on the state of the
economy. The lagged regime enters the function P, to indicate the regime-
dependence of the underlying hazard rates.
The results in this section imply that the equilibrium political regime in





1 with Prob P(k∗
t,dt−1,at−1)
0 with Prob 1 − P(k∗
t,dt−1,at−1) . (8)
One of these states is the equilibrium capital stock, the determination of
which is discussed next.
3.4 Equilibrium capital accumulation
Here, we discuss the last stage of the game, when investment decisions are
made. Given the utility function (2), the ﬁrst-order condition for optimal
investment by the young in period t − 1 is:
−Vc(wt−1 − kt) + Et−1[rt] = 0 , (9)
where the expectation refers to the uncertainty about the future political
regime at. An individual investor takes the behavior of other individuals as
given, but has perfect foresight about the equilibrium capital stock, k∗
t. By (8)
and our earlier assumptions, the expected return for an individual investor
among the young in period t − 1 is:
Et−1[rt] = fk(k
∗
t)[1 + (1 − p
∗
t)α] . (10)
11Combining (9) and (10), and setting kt = k∗
t, we can implicitly deﬁne the





t)[1 + (1 − p
∗
t)α] = 0 . (11)
At k = 0 the second term goes to +∞ (since 1 > p∗
t > 0, even if k = 0 and
fk(0) = +∞). Hence, kt = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Moreover, under
our assumption on preferences, the ﬁrst term tends to −∞ as kt approaches
wt−1. Hence, an equilibrium with positive capital exists.
By the implicit function theorem applied to (11) and the expression for
equilibrium wages, the equilibrium capital stock in period t is a known func-







To determine the properties of this "structural form", we assume that Vcc +
fkk[(1 − p∗
t)α + p∗
t] − fkPk(α − 1) < 0. Under this condition, the K function
is always increasing in lagged capital, kt−1. It is decreasing (increasing) in p∗
t
if TFP is higher (lower) in democracy than in autocracy: Kp ≶ 0 as α ≷ 0.
Intuitively, if democracies have higher TFP (α > 0), a higher probability of
autocracy reduces the expected return of investment. Likewise, a switch from
at−1 = 0 to at−1 = 1 raises k∗
t if α > 0; if period t−1 wages are higher under
democracy, this implies higher capital accumulation.
3.5 Political and economic equilibrium
The structural equations of the model (7) and (12) jointly determine equi-
librium capital accumulation and, via (8), the (stochastic) equilibrium evo-
lution of the political regime, as a function of the predetermined political
and economic variables (kt−1,dt−1,at−1). Note that these equations imply an
"exclusion restriction": democratic capital dt−1 inﬂuences capital accumula-
tion only through the probability of autocracy, p∗
t. We rely on this exclusion
restriction in the empirical analysis to follow.




t = ￿ F(kt−1,dt−1,at−1) (13)
k
∗
t = ￿ G(kt−1,dt−1,at−1) .
12Under the additional assumption that |Kp| > |Pk|, we obtain the follow-
ing reduced-form predictions: (i) Higher democratic capital always reduces
the probability of autocracy: ￿ Fd < 0. (ii) Higher lagged capital reduces (in-
creases) the probability of autocracy if TFP is higher (lower) under democ-
racy than under autocracy: ￿ Fk   0 as α   0. (iii) Higher democratic capital
increases (decreases) the capital stock if TFP is higher (lower) under democ-
racy than under autocracy: ￿ Gd   0 as α   0. (iv) Higher lagged capital
always increases capital accumulation: ￿ Gk > 0.
Associated with (13), we can also write the equilibrium hazard rates (5)





￿ H0(kt−1,dt−1) if at−1 = 0
￿ H1(kt−1,dt−1) if at−1 = 1 .
(14)
The regime dependent ￿ Ha functions have properties consistent with (i) and
(ii) of the F function. Thus: (i) higher democratic capital raises the hazard
rate out of democracy and decreases the hazard rate out of autocracy; (ii)
higher lagged physical capital reduces the hazard rate out of democracy and
increases the hazard rate out of autocracy if TFP is higher under democracy
than under autocracy. As further discussed below, this reduced-form speci-
ﬁcation of the hazard rates is the basis for our empirical analysis of regime
transitions.
In Section 3 below, we formulate a speciﬁc law of motion, assuming that
democratic capital accumulates during democracy and depreciates under au-
tocracy: i.e., as individuals live under democratic rule, they learn to love it.
If democracy indeed yields higher productivity (if α > 0), the dynamics of
the model imply a self-sustaining virtuous circle. When a country becomes a
democracy, it enjoys higher eﬃciency. This increases per capita income and
the returns to investment. As a result of both forces, capital accumulation
and hence per capita income go up. This, in turn, leads to the consolidation
of democracy, which (if α > 0), leads to even higher investment in physical
capital. The stability of democracy and the positive eﬀects on investment
are further enhanced by the ongoing accumulation of democratic capital. In
other words, democratic capital adds a multiplier eﬀect to this self-sustaining
virtuous circle. Conversely, autocracies remain trapped in a situation of low
productivity, low investment and more instability. The model thus makes
precise why younger democracies may be more unstable: the risk of over-
throw is higher because they have accumulated less democratic capital as
13well as less physical capital. naturally, this virtuous circle is only present for
those countries where democracy indeed brings about higher productivity. If
this premise is violated, democratic capital accumulation continues to pro-
mote democratic stability, but the positive feedback eﬀect through physical
capital accumulation is lost.
3.6 Predictions for observables
Two issues remain when formulating the testable predictions of the model.
First, we only observe per capita income, y, and not the physical capital
stock, k. However, using the production function yt = A(at)f(kt), we can
re-express the model predictions of interest in terms of observables. Second,
we have left open the question whether TFP is indeed higher in democracies
than in autocracies. However, we approach the data under this maintained
assumption, so as to diminish the taxonomy of cases. Under this prior, we
can summarize the theoretical predictions as follows
a. Political transitions Beginning with the reduced-form hazard rates,





H0(yt−1,dt−1) if at−1 = at = 0
H1(yt−1,dt−1) if at−1 = at = 1 , (15)
where the regime-dependent relation between yt−1 and kt−1, due to A(at−1),
is absorbed in the functional operators. According to this reduced form, the
hazard rate out of democracy is decreasing in democratic capital and lagged
income (H0
d < 0 and H0
y < 0), whereas the eﬀects on the hazard rate out of
autocracy are increasing in these variables (H1
d > 0 and H1
y > 0). In Section
5, we test these predictions while estimating a set of regime-speciﬁc hazard
rates.
b. Income on structural form We can convert (12) into a structural
form for income:





where the inclusion of a∗
t and at−1 reﬂects prospective breaks in the one-to-one
relation between income and capital, due to regime-dependent TFP. Here,
our goal is to test the prediction that current democracy has a positive eﬀect
14on current income: Y (p∗
t,yt−1,at−1,1) < Y (p∗
t,yt−1,at−1,0). But the model
also predicts that current income is decreasing in the probability of autocracy
(Yp < 0). Therefore, omitting regime expectations from the speciﬁcation will
bias downwards the estimated eﬀect of democracy on income. An equation
like (16) is hard to estimate, however, since both p∗
t and a∗
t are endogenous
to yt−1 and at−1, as well as democratic capital, dt−1.
Within a given political regime, a, capital and income remain one for one.
Moreover, p∗
t — by the deﬁnition in (6) — can be replaced by the regime-speciﬁc
hazard, ha∗







t ,yt−1) if at−1 = at = 0
Y 1(h1∗
t ,yt−1) if at−1 = at = 1 . (17)
According to this structural form, income is decreasing in the hazard rate out
of democracy (Y 0
h < 0), and increasing in the hazard rate out of autocracy
(Y 1
h > 0). Using the hazard rates generated in Section 5, we can isolate
these structural eﬀects of regime expectations on growth by the exclusion
restriction that democratic capital aﬀects income only indirectly, through the
hazard rate. In Section 6, we test these structural predictions. Because the
identifying assumptions required for consistently estimating the parameters
are less demanding for (17) than for (16), we begin by the within-regime
speciﬁcation.
c. Income on reduced form Whereas consistent estimation of the struc-
tural forms requires quite strong identifying assumptions, estimation of the
reduced forms for income is more straightforward. Using (7) and (8) in (16),
we can write
yt = G(yt−1,dt−1,at−1) . (18)
Combining the results above (and assuming α > 0), we get the prediction
that current income is increasing in democratic capital (Gd > 0), although
we cannot separately identify the eﬀect running through the actual current
regime and the eﬀect running through regime expectations. Further, income
is increasing in lagged income (Gy > 0), whereas the eﬀect of the past regime
can have any sign. Section 6 tests these predictions as well, by estimating a
set of reduced-form growth regressions.
The discussion in this subsection gives a crude roadmap to the empir-
ical work to follow. The details of our econometric speciﬁcation are best
15discussed in context. Convincingly defending our identiﬁcation strategy re-
quires that the reader be knowledgeable about our data, however, including
our measurement of democratic capital. The next section is devoted to these
issues.
4 Data
We collect annual data on economic development and political regimes for as
manycountries and as far back as possible. The resulting panel is unbalanced,
partly because of data availability and partly because countries do not enter
the data set until their year of independence. The Data Appendix at the end
of the paper provides more detailed deﬁnitions and sources of all variables
used in the empirical analysis.
For each country i and year t in our data set, we observe output (GDP) per
capita, yi,t in the data set compiled by Angus Maddison and his collaborators
(see Maddison, 2001). Uninterrupted data are available from 2000 backwards
for most countries, as far back as to 1870 for a number of countries, and to
1850 for some countries. Per capita output is always measured in natural
logarithms.
The state of democracy of country i in year t, ai,t is deﬁned in two al-
ternative ways. As in the model, we treat the political regime as a binary
variable. Our ﬁrst deﬁnition of democracy is based on the Polity IV data
set and is available for all countries above 1/2 million inhabitants from 1800
until 2000. Speciﬁcally, we set ai,t = 1 if the polity2 variable takes a strictly
positive value, and ai,t = 0 otherwise. This variable has a maximum of 10
and a minimum of -10, depending on the status of six diﬀerent aspects of
political institutions, with a focus on executive powers, executive selection
and the freedom of elections. The regime transitions implied by this deﬁn-
ition are typically non-trivial and accord well with common interpretations
of political history.
Our second deﬁnition of democracy is based on Boix and Rosato’s (2001)
extension of the measure constructed by Przeworski et al (2000). It is a more
narrow measure than the Polity variable, which emphasizes the turnover of
political power in free and fair elections. This binary variable is available
from 1800 until 1994. In a few instances, the Boix and Rosato variable is
missing while the Polity IV variable is not (for instance, Boix and Rosato do
not attempt to code transition years, while polity2 interpolates such years).
16In such cases, we supplement the Boix and Rosato deﬁnition with the Polity
IV deﬁnition.
According to both measures, the historical development of democracy
varies a great deal across countries. Some nations, such as Afghanistan,
China, and Morocco, never experience a transition into democracy. Others,
like Australia and Canada, start out as democracies right at independence
and never experience an autocratic period. Yet others, such as Costa Rica
and Denmark, start out autocratic and then make a single irreversible tran-
sition into democracy. A large number of countries have a more eventful
history, however, with repeated, intermittent spells of democracy and autoc-
racy. According to the Polity IV measure, Guatemala is the most extreme
case, having gone through six periods of democracy and six periods of au-
tocracy since reaching independence in 1839.
The intersection of the economic and political data deﬁnes an unbalanced
panel, with annual data for about 150 countries over at most 150 years.
4.1 How to measure democratic capital?
To test the predictions discussed at the end of the model section, we need
an operational deﬁnition of democratic capital, dt. For a more narrow set
of countries and a shorter time period, one could think of many imagina-
tive ways of approaching this task. Keeping within the sparse data of our
broad historical panel, however, we create two variables. The ﬁrst is called
domestic democratic capital, and is denoted by zt. We assume that this com-
ponent accumulates over time, when the members of society gradually gain
experience with living in a democracy. This idea has intuitive appeal. A
number of mechanisms could make a long-standing democracy more resilient
to a coup than a short-standing one, including the build-up of formal and
informal institutions from political parties to social norms. The same insti-
tutions would make the re-institution of democracy more likely in a nation
lapsing into autocracy.
What we need to do here is to specify how a particular historical path
in country i up to year t, {ai,t−τ}
τ=t0
τ=0 , maps into a value of zi,t. We are very
agnostic about functional form. The simplest assumption might be to assume
that democratic capital accumulates in years of democracy, and depreciates
geometrically, at the rate (1 − δ), in years of autocracy:
zi,t = (1 − ai,t) + δzi,t−1 .
17In this case, we can solve backwards to obtain (assuming that initial demo-
cratic capital is zero):





where t0 is either the year of independence or the year of 1800, whichever
comes last. Thus, democratic experience is more valuable the closer to the
present it is. Note that uninterrupted democracy makes democratic capital
eventually converge to a steady-state value. We use the notation z(δ) to
emphasize that dependence on the depreciation rate, and multiply with (1−δ)
such that the resulting expression is scaled to [0,1]. As further discussed
further, δ is estimated from the data.
Figure 1 illustrates the time path of domestic democratic capital for two
countries, namely Spain and Sweden, given two values for δ = 0.94 (in part
a) and 0.99 (in part b), which turn out to be the maximum and minimum
values we estimate below.2 As the data begin, in 1800, Spain starts out as
an autocracy. A ﬁrst brief two-year period of democracy in the early 1870s
(the First Republic) leads to a marginal accumulation of democratic capital,
followed by depreciation due to a six-year relapse of autocracy. Reforms in
1876 institute a constitutional monarchy, and Spain enters a period when the
Liberal and Conservative parties alternate in power. This democratic period
(according to the Polity IV criterion) entails considerable accumulation of
democratic capital, until the coup of General Primo de Rivera in 1923. At a
relatively high level of domestic democratic capital, democracy returns with
the establishment of the Second Republic in 1931, only to be broken by the
establishment of the Franco dictatorship. After Franco’s death, democratic
capital once more starts accumulating in 1976, to more or less reach the
earlier 1930s level in the year 2000.
Sweden’s history looks very diﬀerent. After a series of small reforms in the
late 19th century, the breakthrough of parliamentarism and the institution of
universal male suﬀrage give Sweden democratic status in 1910 (by the Polity
IV criterion). Uninterrupted democracy since that date brings continued
accumulation until the year 2000.
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the eﬀects of the depreciation rate 1 − δ.
The higher depreciation rate (of 0.06) in Fig 1a makes the paths of domestic
2The deﬁnition of democracy used in Figure 1 is that by Polity 4.
18democratic capital steeper — during democracy, as well as autocracy — than
the paths with the lower depreciation rate (of 0.01) in Fig 1b. The higher
depreciation rate makes the Spanish relapses into autocracy more costly and,
as a result, Sweden’s domestic democratic capital catches up with that of
Spain around 1930, rather than around 1950. Moreover, in Figure 1a Sweden
has more or less converged to the democratic steady state (of 1) by the year
2000, whereas it has 40% of the way to go in Figure 1b.
The second component of democratic capital is based on democratic con-
ditions abroad. It is easily imagined how the experience with democracy in
foreign, neighboring countries could spill over into greater domestic appre-
ciation of democracy and greater willingness to defend these values. As we
do not directly observe these spill-overs, however, we have to ﬁnd a parsi-
moniously deﬁned proxy given our data. Thus, we create the variable for-
eign democratic capital, labeled ft, to measure a country’s "closeness to
democracy", given the incidence of democracy in neighboring countries. We
have tried out diﬀerent versions of this speciﬁcation, with alternative sets of
weights corresponding to closeness in terms of geography, history or culture.
The results below are based on geography and the Polity IV democracy data.







where aj,t is a measure of how autocratic is the regime of country j in year t
and the weight ̟(ρ)
i,j
t measures the distance between country i and country
j. Speciﬁcally, let Di,j be the (time-invariant) great circle distance between
the capitals in i and j, D be half the length of the equator, and Nt be
the number of independent countries in the world with a polity2 score in
year t. Then, we impose ̟(ρ)
i,j
t = (1 − Di,j
D )/Nt if Di,j




D > ρ. In words, the weight ̟(ρ)
i,j
t is a declining function of the
standardized distance between i and j; if the relative distance Di,j
D is outside
the radius ρ, the weight drops to zero. The dependence of our measure of
foreign democratic capital on ρ is emphasized by the notation f(ρ). Like δ,
ρ is estimated from the data. Finally, we replace (1 − aj,t) by country j’s
continuous polity2 score and divide by 10, such that the resulting expression
is scaled to [0,1].
Figure 2 illustrates the time path of foreign democratic capital in two
countries, namely Belgium and Chile, when ρ = 1, such that every country
19j in the world is included in the neighborhood.3 The two variables share a
general time pattern, reﬂecting the gradual adoption of democracy through-
out the 19th century and three waves of democratization in the 20th century.
Why is Belgium’s foreign democratic capital more variable than that of Chile?
Because Belgium is closer to the coincident deteriorations — in the interwar
period — and improvements — in the early 1900s and the 1990s — of demo-
cratic conditions across Europe, while Chile is closer to the more dispersed
political transitions in Latin America.
Reassuringly, both components of democratic capital are strongly cor-
related with citizens’ opinions about the value of democracy as a form of
government in a large cross section of countries. In the late 1990s, the World
Value Surveys asked individuals of about 60 developing and developed coun-
tries to rank (on a 1 to 4 scale) their agreement with the following statement:
"Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of gov-
ernment". The average response in each country can be taken as a rough
measure of how much democracy is appreciated.4
In column 1 of Table 1, we regress these average country responses against
the two components (domestic and foreign) of democratic capital measured
in 1999. Both components are strongly and signiﬁcantly correlated with ap-
preciation of democracy. The remaining columns of Table 1 show that the
correlation persists and becomes even stronger as we control for economic
development, for the current political regime and for human capital (gauged
by average school attainment as in Barro and Lee, 2000), all measured in
1999. Figure 3 shows that the correlations behind the estimates in Table 1
(column 4) are not due to outliers. Interestingly, columns 3 and 4 of the
table suggest that the appreciation of democracy as a form of government
is higher in autocracies than in democracies, once we control for democratic
capital. These correlations conﬁrm that our measures of democratic capital
are not empty. Individuals value democracy more if they live in a coun-
try with a long democratic tradition and if they are surrounded by other
democracies, irrespective of economic development, average education and
3Since f(ρ)i,t is only deﬁned by the neighbors of country i, we can draw the (hypo-
thetical) foreign democractic capital of Belgium and Chile before the years in which they
become independent nations (in 1830 and 1818, repectively).
4In the World Value Surveys, a value of 1 corresponds to strong agreement, while 4
corresponds to strong disagreement with the statement in the text. In Table 1 and Figure 3
below, we measure the appreciation of democracy as 4 minus the country average response
(times a 100); thus, higher values correspond to more appreciation for democracy.
20the current political regime.
But what about our identifying assumptions? As explained above, to
identify the eﬀect of the probability of democracy on growth, we have to
assume that our measure of democratic capital inﬂuences the willingness of
citizens to stand up for democracy, but has no direct eﬀect on growth (after
conditioning on other controls, including country ﬁxed eﬀects). Motivated
by this concern, in columns 6 and 7 we also look at the correlation between
democratic capital and a widely used measure of property right institutions,
which is also based on perceptions data. The variable Government Anti Di-
version Policies (GADP) is used by Hall and Jones (1999) and many others
in the macroeconomic development literature to capture the eﬀect of insti-
tutions on economic development. After controlling for per-capita income,
current democracy, and (in column 7) human capital, no positive correla-
tion is left between perceptions of property rights protection and democratic
capital. If anything, foreign democratic capital appears to be negatively —
not positively — correlated with GADP. This reassures us that the assumed
exclusion restriction is not grossly inconsistent with the data.
We now turn to study the role of democratic capital in explaining political
and economic development in our long historical panel.
5 Political transitions
In this section, we study transitions from democracy into autocracy and vice
versa, using yearly data back to the mid 1800s.
5.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
Our main goal is to test whether democratic capital indeed reduces the hazard
out of democracy and increases the hazard out of autocracy, as predicted by
the model. We also want to consider the impact of economic development
on the hazard rate, expecting to ﬁnd higher income being associated with
more stability of democracy and more instability of autocracy. A rejection of
this prediction could mean either that democracy does not have any higher
productivity than autocracy (that α < 0), or that economic well-being is not
a determinant of the citizens’ willingness to stand up for democracy (that
γ = 0 in equation (4)). In addition to the substantive results, we obtain
two sets of estimated hazard rates, one out of democracy and one out of
21autocracy. As already mentioned, these will be used in Section 6 to test the
prediction that a higher probability of autocracy reduces economic growth.
What is the speciﬁcation that we take to the data? We start from the
reduced-form hazard rates out of democracy and autocracy, equation (15).
Drawing on the previous section, we replace dt−1 in the theory with domestic
and foreign democratic capital, z(δ)i,t−1 and f(ρ)i,t−1, as deﬁned in the pre-
vious section. In addition to lagged income yi,t−1, we also include a number
of ﬁxed and time varying controls xi,t to reﬂect country-speciﬁc probabilities
of a coup or an uprise, corresponding to χ(a) in the model. Thus, we want




a(z(δ)i,t−1, f(ρ)i,t−1, yi,t−1, xi,t) +  i,t, a = 0,1 , (21)
where  i,t is an error term. Following the distributional assumption (about
ν) in the model, and taking the right-censoring of our data on democracy
into account, we specify each hazard rate as a probit.
How do we carry out the estimation? The two democratic-capital vari-
ables are only deﬁned up to the parameters δ and ρ. These two parameters
thus enter both hazard rates. Using the deﬁnitions in (19) and (20) and
imposing the constraint that δ and ρ are equal across the two hazard rates,
we obtain a well-deﬁned likelihood function. With so many regime shifts for
a number of countries and so many country pairs, however, this likelihood
function is highly non-linear. To ﬁnd the maximum likelihood values, we
follow an incremental procedure. First, we ﬁx values for δ and ρ; then we
estimate all the other parameters and associated standard errors and com-
pute the value of the likelihood function. We repeat this procedure for a
large range of values of δ and ρ, always re-estimating all other parameters as
we vary δ and ρ. This way we create an envelope to the likelihood function
over δ and ρ. Finally, we select the values of δ and ρ (and all other parame-
ters) corresponding to the maximum of the (envelope) likelihood function.
This yields maximum likelihood estimates of all coeﬃcients of interest, ex-
cept that the estimated standard errors treat parameters δ and ρ as known
(rather than estimated).
For ρ, this procedure always yields a unique maximum independently of
the speciﬁcation, namely ρ = 1, i.e., all countries in the world are included
in the neighborhood. For δ, the maximum value depends on the speciﬁcation
of the underlying hazard rates, but always lies in the interval [0.94,0.99] —
see further below.
22Our basic hazard rates pool together all the data over countries and years.
This raises an issue familiar from the labor literature: state dependence vs.
unobserved heterogeneity. According to our theory, two countries at the
same levels of income and other observables need not have the same hazard
rate. Speciﬁcally, a democracy with longer and more recent experience of
democratic regime in the past, or with more democratic neighbors, should
have a higher democratic capital and a lower estimated probability of making
a transition towards autocracy.5 Still, such a country may be more stable
not because of its democratic history and environment, but because of some
other unobserved and slow-moving variable making it more stable. To cope
with this omitted-variable problem, we re-estimate the hazard rates allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of a random country eﬀect. We
then test (by a likelihood ratio test) whether the pooled speciﬁcation can
be rejected in favor of the random-eﬀect speciﬁcation (see further discussion
below).
5.2 Basic results
We start with the most parsimonious speciﬁcation, which only includes the
variables of interest: domestic and foreign democratic capital and per capita
income. With this speciﬁcation, the maximum likelihood estimate of the
depreciation rate of democratic capital is δ = 0.94 (and the neighborhood
radius is ρ = 1). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report the hazard rate out of
democracy and autocracy, respectively. The estimated coeﬃcients on both
components of democratic capital are highly statistically signiﬁcant and have
the expected sign: democratic capital reduces the probability of exit from
democracy (column 1) and has the opposite eﬀect on exit from autocracy
(column 2).
A higher income level signiﬁcantly decreases the risk of exit from democ-
racy (column 1), but it has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of exit from
autocracy (column 2). This asymmetric income eﬀect on the two hazard rates
reproduces earlier ﬁndings by Przeworski et al (2000) and (conditional on the
speciﬁcation) by Acemoglu et al (2005b). In terms of the theoretical model
above, a negative income eﬀect on exit from democracy is consistent with
the average democracy being more productive than the average autocracy
5In analogy with labor economics, our procedure thus augments the information of
the length of current unemployment spells with accounts of the full lifetime uneploy-
ment/employment history of each individual in the sample.
23(α > 0 in the model), and with the assumption that citizens are more willing
to ﬁght for democracy if the economic stakes are higher (γ > 0 in (4)). But
these assumptions also imply that the exit from autocracy should fall with
income, and this is not what we ﬁnd.
A possible interpretation of this asymmetric income eﬀect is that political
transitions diﬀer, depending on the initial state. The social and political
mechanisms that prevent a successful coup are diﬀerent from those associated
with the ousting of a dictator. In terms of our model, the perceived social
beneﬁt of defending democracy from a coup depends on the economic stakes
and goes up with income (γ > 0 in democracy). But the social beneﬁt of
overthrowing a dictator is not aﬀected by the state of the economy (γ = 0 in
autocracy).
The regressions underlying columns 1 and 2 pool all countries together
and thus exploit both within and across country variation. This raises an
important concern. Domestic democratic capital summarizes the history of
democracy in each country. Perhaps the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of this vari-
able is just hiding unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., some omitted variable that
varies across countries but not over time). This suspicion is also supported by
the signiﬁcant p-value in the row labeled "LR-test". This statistic refers to
a likelihood-ratio test for a speciﬁcation with random country-speciﬁc eﬀects
against our basic pooled speciﬁcation (i.e., a test of the null that the share of
the variance explained by the random country eﬀects is zero). A signiﬁcant
p-value means that the random country eﬀects explain a signiﬁcant fraction
of the variance in the data.
In terms of our model, the speciﬁcation in columns 1 and 2 really assumes
the probability that a coup or uprise opportunity presents itself is the same
across countries and time: i.e., that χi,t(a) is the same for all i and t. To relax
this strong assumption in columns 3-6, we add a number of control variables
to pick up country and time variation in this generic instability: indicators
for years t in which country i was at war (contemporaneous and lagged once);
several indicators for ﬁxed country characteristics: legal and colonial history,
geographic location, how democratic the country was when it ﬁrst became
independent (or when the score for polity2 ﬁrst became available); an indica-
tor for the few countries that switched regimes more than 5 times; a ﬂexible
polynomial in time to capture worldwide trends in the incidence of democ-
racy and autocracy (the results are robust to replacing such polynomials with
24indicators for 20-year periods).6 While columns 3 and 4 use the Polity IV
deﬁnition of democracy, columns 5 and 6 use the Boix and Rosato deﬁnition
for an otherwise almost identical speciﬁcation of the hazard rates (full details
are provided in the note to Table 2 and the variables are deﬁned in a data
appendix). With this speciﬁcation, the maximum likelihood value estimate
of the depreciation rate of democratic capital is δ = 0.99 (columns 3-4) and
δ = 0.97 (columns 5-6), respectively.
As is evident from Table 2, the results on democratic capital and income
from the most parsimonious speciﬁcations hold up very well. Among the
other results (not reported), the occurrence of wars is destabilizing both for
democracies and autocracies, but the eﬀect of war on autocracies manifests
itself one year after the war, while it is contemporaneous in democracies.
Countries starting out with stronger constraints on the executive turn out
to be more stable as democracies, but no less stable as autocracies (given
domestic democratic capital). Most of the other historical or geographic
dummy variables have statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, as do the ﬁrst and
second component of the polynomial in time. These results are robust to
alternative speciﬁcations with similar controls.
With this speciﬁcation, the likelihood-ratio test for randomeﬀects is never
statistically signiﬁcant, although the p-value is lower in column 4 (autocracy
as deﬁned by Polity IV) than in the other columns. This test relies on
functional-form assumptions (about the hazard function and the inﬂuence of
the random eﬀects on the political transition). Nevertheless, the results are
robust to alternative assumptions about the hazard function.7
Overall, exit from democracy is more successfully explained than exit
from autocracy. The pseudo R-square (i.e., roughly the percent increment in
the number of correctly predicted outcomes in the model at hand relative to
a model with only a constant) is about 22% for exit out of democracy, and
about half of that for exit out of autocracy. But the estimated annual prob-
6We cannot run the hazard rates with ﬁxed year eﬀects, becuse the onset of democracy
and autocracy is rare enough that we would perfectly predict too many transitions.
7The LR tests in Table 2 are based on estimates of a random eﬀects logit (vs. a pooled
logit), which is consistent with a proportional hazard model with a logistic hazard and a
normally distributed random country eﬀect (see e.g., Jenkins, 2004). Similar results are
obtained with a complementary loglog hazard model. In these random eﬀects estimates,
both components of democratic capital remain highly signiﬁcant in the hazard functions
out of democracy, while foreign (but not domestic) democratic capital remains signiﬁcant
in the hazard function out of autocracy.
25abilities of transitions remain low. Figure 4 shows frequency distributions of
the estimated probabilities of exit from democracy and autocracy, based on
the speciﬁcations in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. Although the probability
of exit from democracy (autocracy) can be as high as 50% (30%) for some
observations, most of the probability mass is concentrated between 0 and
10%, with average hazard rates around 2 -3%.
On average, political transitions are thus rare events, making both polit-
ical regimes quite stable. Moreover, the determinants of interest have quite
modest eﬀects on the probability of transition, despite their high statisti-
cal signiﬁcance. In particular, by the point estimates in columns 3 and 4,
a one-time jump of domestic democratic capital from its minimum of 0 to
its maximum of 1 would reduce the probability of exit from democracy by
almost 2 percentage points and raise the probability of exit from autocracy
by almost 5 percentage points for an average country-year in the sample.
According to the same estimates, a hike in foreign democratic capital of
about 0.4 — corresponding to the change in European countries from 1970 to
2000 (cf. Figure 2) — reduces the hazard rate out of democracy by almost 2
percentage points and raises the hazard rate out of autocracy by about 3.5
percentage points.
5.3 Robustness
The test for random eﬀects checks for the presence of random omitted vari-
ables invariant over time and orthogonal to the other regressors. To allow for
a country eﬀect correlated with some of the regressors, we have also estimated
the hazard rates by conditional logit, including country ﬁxed eﬀects. This
way we estimate the coeﬃcients of interest from the within-country variation
only, exploiting the countries that have completed at least one spell in the
relevant regime. Unfortunately, this dramatically restricts the sample. When
estimating the risk of exit from democracy, we lose all long-lived democra-
cies, which never leave their single democratic spell. Correspondingly, we
lose all countries experiencing just one spell of autocracy without ever be-
coming democracies. Some, but not all, of the results reported in Table 2 are
robust to this estimation method. Speciﬁcally: (i) The eﬀect of foreign demo-
cratic capital on both hazard rates is very robust. (ii) The negative eﬀect of
per-capita income on the hazard rate out of democracy is very robust, and
per-capita income now becomes signiﬁcant, with the expected (positive) sign
also under autocracy. These ﬁndings contradict those of Acemoglu, Robinson
26and Yared (2005b), although these authors use as the dependent value the
full discrete (21-step) polity2 score rather than a binary indicator. (iii) The
eﬀect of domestic democratic capital on both regimes is not robust, how-
ever (the estimated coeﬃcient changes sign and is signiﬁcant in both hazard
rates). This lack of robustness seems to be due to the drastic selection (and
reduction) of the sample. But the issue remains to be more carefully studied.
Table 3 further investigates the robustness of the results in Table 2. An
important issue is whether democratic capital, as we measure it, really picks
up the historical experience of (or the geographic proximity to) democracy
as such, rather than some other factor that could be producing similar re-
sults. Already Lipset (1959) and Almond and Verba (1963) pointed to the
correlation between education and attitudes towards democracy. Recently
Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2005) present additional evidence of such a
correlation. They also present a formal (but static) model of the participa-
tion of citizens in support of democracy by political action, in analogy with
the model presented in Section 2 above. The Glaeser et al model predicts
that the likelihood of a successful coup against democracy is decreasing in
the level of education, and that the likelihood of a successful uprise against
autocracy is increasing in the level of education.
How are the hazard rates estimated in this section aﬀected by the level of
education? We do not have any wide ranging measure of education sampled
far back in time for a large number of countries. From 1960, however, we
can use an annual measure of the education level of the population above
25 years of age, constructed in Persson (2005) by interpolating the ﬁve-year
observations from Barro and Lee (2000).8 This measure of human capital
is quite closely correlated with our variable domestic democratic capital, on
the order of 0.6 in the full sample.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 show the results for our most parsimonious
speciﬁcation of the hazard rates, identical to that in columns 1 and 2 of Table
2, except for the shorter sample period and the addition of human capital (we
retain δ = 0.94 as in Table 2). The estimate is indeed statistically signiﬁcant
with the expected sign: education reduces the risk of exit from democracy and
increases the risk of exit from autocracy. Our two measures of democratic
capital remain signiﬁcant both under democracy and autocracy, however,
and the point estimates are even higher in absolute value than in Table 2.
8The Barro and Lee variable is also one of the measaures used by Glaeser, Ponzetto
and Shleifer (2005).
27The eﬀect of income on the probability of regime change also remains similar
to that in Table 2.
To facilitate the interpretation of our results, the rest of Table 3 decom-
poses the eﬀect of domestic democratic capital into one component corre-
sponding to the current spell (under democracy or under autocracy), and
another corresponding to more distant political history. Speciﬁcally, column
3 estimates the risk of exit from democracy by replacing domestic democratic
capital with "current domestic democratic capital", the amount accumulated
in the current democratic spell (i.e., this variable starts oﬀ at zero at the be-
ginning of each new democratic spell) and "past democratic capital", the
remaining component of democratic capital (i.e., total domestic democratic
capital minus the current component). Only the current component turns
out to be statistically signiﬁcant, while more distant democratic history does
not seem to matter. This ﬁnding is further conﬁrmed in column 4, where
current and past domestic democratic capital are constrained to have the
same coeﬃcient (as in Table 2). Instead, we add the duration of the cur-
rent democratic spell as a further control. With δ = 0.99, the duration of
the current spell and our measure of current domestic democratic capital are
almost collinear. Indeed, the estimated coeﬃcient on these two variables is
almost identical and the coeﬃcient on current duration is more precisely es-
timated, although the high collinearity deprives both variables of statistical
signiﬁcance.
Finally, we ask the same question about the risk of exit from autocracy.
Here, we cannot decompose democratic capital into current and past, because
no democratic capital is accumulated under autocracy. Instead, following
column 4, we add the duration of the current autocratic spell as a regressor to
our basic speciﬁcation in column 5. Here, the duration of the current spell is
not statistically signiﬁcant, while domestic democratic capital retains its sign
and signiﬁcance. Thus, the data suggest that distant democratic experience
is relevant in explaining exit from autocracy, while what makes democracies
stable is the duration of the current democratic regime. Together with the
diﬀerent eﬀect of per capita income, this asymmetry underlines that regime
transitions out of democracy are genuinely diﬀerent than transitions out of
autocracy.
286 Economic growth
In this section, we use our panel to estimate structural and reduced forms
corresponding to the growth part of our theoretical model. The ﬁrst subsec-
tion deals with democratic and autocratic regimes separately, looking at the
eﬀect of regime stability on growth. The remaining subsections consider the
full sample also comparing growth across regimes.
6.1 Within regimes — structural form
6.1.1 Econometric speciﬁcation











i,t + γxi,t + αi + θt + ǫi,t , a = 0,1 . (22)
This equation can be derived from (17) by assuming log-linearity (y denotes
the log of per capita income), subtracting yi,t−1 fromboth sides, and assuming
that the error term εi,t has a speciﬁc country and year component in addition
to white noise. The predicted hazard rate out of regime a, in country i during
year t, ￿ ha
i,t is obtained from the estimates in Section 5, the vector xi,t contains
additional time-varying controls, as described below, while αi and θt denote
country and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Specifying an equation for growth rather than
level of income makes the dependent variable more noisy, but diﬀerences out
likely sources of unobserved heterogeneity in the level of income. We do not
adjust our standard errors for the fact that ￿ ha
i,t is a generated regressor.9
Identiﬁcation of the parameter λ
a requires that the hazard rate ￿ ha
i,t is
uncorrelated with the error term, ǫi,t. Note that the country ﬁxed eﬀect αi
in (22) picks up any growth eﬀect of the country-average hazard rate ￿ ha
i,
including any ﬁxed-country characteristics that enter the estimation of the
hazard rate in the last section. Similarly, the year ﬁxed eﬀect θt picks up
any eﬀect on growth of common trends or ﬂuctuations in the yearly average
hazard rate ￿ ha
t. Thus, λ
a is only identiﬁed from the country-speciﬁc time




This variation in our generated regressor is due to just four components:
the indicators for wars and lagged wars, time variation in the domestic and
9Under the null hypothesis that λ
a = 0, the standard errors are still correctly estimated
and thus, the t-statistics are still valid tests of the null.
29foreign components of democratic capital, and lagged income. An indepen-
dent eﬀect of lagged income on growth already appears in (22). To take care
of the likely direct eﬀect of wars on the growth rate, we always include the
two war indicators in xi,t. When it comes to the country-speciﬁc time vari-
ation in domestic and foreign democratic capital, we rely on the exclusion
restriction implied by our model, namely that democratic capital does not
have a direct eﬀect on growth.
For foreign democratic capital, fi,t, the exclusion restriction relies on the
incidence of democracy in neighboring countries being uncorrelated with do-
mestic current growth. This may pose a problem if (i) nearby democracies
have higher incomes than nearby autocracies, and (ii) higher incomes abroad
generate higher domestic growth (say trough international trade). To address
this prospective problem, we deﬁne a new variable called foreign income, y
f
i,t.








t yj,t , (23)
where the bilateral weights ̟(ρ)
i,j
t are identical to the weights used in the
deﬁnition of foreign democratic capital (i.e., weights declining geometrically
in geographic distance). To purge out any (spurious) relation between current
domestic growth and foreign democratic capital, through foreign income, we
always include y
f
i,t in the vector of controls, xi,t.
Another possible concern is that during years of political transitions, the
probability of a coup is high at the same time as growth suﬀers because of
disruptions, political violence, and so on. It is not at all obvious why this
should be a serious concern: by construction, our estimated hazard rates are
just functions of the same variables as those in our growth regressions plus
the two excluded components of democratic capital. Nevertheless, to ensure
that our estimates are not driven by transition years, we also include an
indicator for transition years (the year of entry in autocracy or democracy,
as well as the preceding year).
Finally, in the 1990s many socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope did not only undergo political transformations, but also a deep change
of their economic systems which also aﬀected their growth process. To
avoid confounding these economic and political transitions, we also include
a dummy variable equal to unity after 1989 in the former socialist countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, and in the Asian provinces of the former
30Soviet Union (this variable only enters the regressions under autocracy, as it
is collinear with other included regressors under democracy).
Below, we oﬀer some suggestive evidence that our identifying assumption
is fulﬁlled.
6.1.2 Results
Table 4 displays the estimation results. In parenthesis, we report Huber-
White robust (i.e., allowing for heteroskadasticity) standard errors. Country
and year ﬁxed eﬀects, foreign income, plus indicators for wars and lagged
wars are always included in the speciﬁcation, in addition to the variables
indicated in the left-most column. Throughout the table, we use the hazard
rates as predicted by columns 3 (for democracies) and 4 (for autocracies) of
Table 2, i.e., with the parameter δ = 0.99. We comment below on which
results are robust to alternative values of δ.
Column1 reports the basic regressionfor close to 3,800democratic country-
years in the panel. As expected, lagged income has a negative coeﬃcient,
indicating income convergence of about 4% per year, the coeﬃcient on tran-
sition years is negative, and the coeﬃcient of foreign income (not shown) is
positive and signiﬁcant. More importantly, the coeﬃcient on the hazard rate
out of democracy is highly signiﬁcant with a negative sign, as predicted by
the model in Section 2 under the assumption that democracies have higher
TFP than autocracies (α > 0).
The estimated coeﬃcient on the probability of a transition out of democ-
racy is −12. This looks like a large eﬀect: if the probability were to jump from
0 to 1, the impact on growth would be a fall by 12 percentage points. As dis-
cussed in connection with Figure 4, however, the observed range of variation
of the estimated hazard rates within regimes is small. Let us consider the
experiments discussed in Section 4. Suppose that domestic democratic cap-
ital were hypothetically to increase from its minimum of 0 to its maximum
of 1, cutting the hazard rate out of democracy by about 2 percentage points.
Given the point estimates in column 1, this would raise yearly growth by
over 0.2 percentage points, and — with a convergence rate of 0.04 — long-run
income by about 6 percent. An increase in foreign democratic capital by 0.4
units, corresponding to the diﬀerence in Europe between the 1970s and the
present time (cf. Figure 2), would also cut the hazard rate out of democracy
by just below 2 percentage points and thus, have a similar eﬀect on long-run
income.
31As already discussed, identiﬁcation hinges on the exclusion restriction
that the two components of democratic capital do not exercise a direct eﬀect
on growth (on top of the functional form assumption). How credible is this
restriction? Section 4 presented some independent evidence in favor of the
restriction. The statistical question is whether domestic and foreign demo-
cratic capital are correlated with the residuals from the regression underlying
column 1. We approach this question in the spirit of an “overidentiﬁcation
test”, i.e., we regress these residuals against all “instruments”, i.e., all re-
gressors included in the growth equation plus the two excluded components
of democratic capital. The Sargan-Hansen statistic (the R-squared from the
regression times the number of observations) displayed at the bottom of the
table is very low. While this is not an appropriate test statistic in this context
(as the full model we estimate is not linear), it indicates that the exclusion
restriction is likely to hold. In column 2, we instead add domestic and foreign
democratic capital directly in the regression of column 1. Note that we can
include both components of democratic capital at the same time, because
they enter the predicted hazard rate in a highly non-linear fashion. While
the coeﬃcients on the hazard rate and the other variables are basically unal-
tered, the two components of democratic capital are neither individually nor
jointly signiﬁcant (cf. the F-statistic in column 2).
These results are robust. They hold for a wide range of estimates for
the value of δ in our deﬁnition of democratic capital (for δ between 0.94 and
0.99). They also hold if we add interaction terms between year indicators and
continent indicators to the speciﬁcation, to allow for omitted variables that
might inﬂuence the time proﬁle of growth in diﬀerent ways across groups of
countries.
Columns 3 and 4 of the table show corresponding estimates for close to
4300 autocratic country-years. Here, the ﬁt is generally worse (the adjusted
R-squared drops considerably), and the results are more disappointing from
the viewpoint of the theoretical predictions. Speciﬁcally, the hazard rate out
of autocracy has a negative — not a positive — and marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cient, contradicting the prediction that the probability of exit from autocracy
has a positive eﬀect on growth, if TFP is higher under democracy (α > 0).
The estimates are less precise and less robust than those under democracy.
Both components of democratic capital become insigniﬁcant (though still
with a negative estimated coeﬃcient) with a lower value of the parameter δ
in our deﬁnition of democratic capital, or if we include interactions between
year indicators and continent indicators. If anything, however, the risk of
32exit from autocracy appears to hurt growth, suggesting that the negative
eﬀect of political instability dominates the expected beneﬁt of becoming a
democracy. This negative eﬀect of political instability under autocracy is
consistent with similar ﬁndings by Przeworski et al (2000)
Overall, these results suggest a puzzling asymmetry between democracies
and autocracies. According to the theoretical model, the risk of exit from
a political regime hurts growth, if TFP is higher under the regime that is
abandoned, compared to the regime entered into. Thus, if democracy has
higher TFP than autocracy on average, we should ﬁnd that the risk of leaving
democracy hurts growth, and the risk of leaving autocracy induces faster
growth. The data support the ﬁrst but not the second prediction. A possible
interpretation of this puzzle is that the eﬀect of democratic government on
economic performance diﬀers across countries. In the group of countries
that are more often in the democratic state, democracy on average leads to a
superior performance than autocracy; while in the group of countries that are
more often under autocracy, the two forms of government do not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer in terms of economic performance. Note that this interpretation is also
consistent with the asymmetric eﬀect of income on the hazard rate under the
two political regimes discussed in Section 5.
Using the alternative deﬁnition of democracy by Boix and Rosato, yields
similar results.10 Both estimated hazard rates have a negative eﬀect on
growth. The eﬀect in democracies is again more precisely estimated (and
statistically signiﬁcant) than that within autocracies.
6.2 Across regimes — structural form
6.2.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
We now proceed to the full sample across political regimes. Speciﬁcally, we
estimate an equation like:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = βyi,t−1 + φ(1 − ai,t) + λ￿ pi,t + γxi,t + αi + θt + ǫi,t (24)
Following the discussion in Section 3, we also control for the actual political
regime as measured by the binary variable (1−ai,t) (i.e., an indicator variable
for democracy). Further, we replace the within-regime hazard rate with the
probability of autocracy, ￿ pi,t, deﬁned in accordance with (6) in Section 3 (by
10Here, we use the hazard rates estimated in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.
33that deﬁnition, the lagged regime ai,t−1 also enters on the right-hand side).
Our parameters of interest are thus φ and λ, capturing the growth eﬀects of
democracy (vs. autocracy) and of the probability of autocracy.
As the democracy variable is binary and we include ﬁxed country and year
eﬀects, we estimate the parameter φ by a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodol-
ogy, where countries experiencing a regime change are "treated", and those
not experiencing a regime change at that time are "controls".11 Our identify-
ing assumption is that the selection of countries into democracy or autocracy
is uncorrelated with the country-speciﬁc and time-varying shock to growth,
ǫi,t. Note that this allows any kind of correlation between regime selection
and the country-speciﬁc, but time-invariant, component of the error term in
the growth equation, αi. Thus, some fast (or low) growth countries could
systematically be more likely to become democracies (or autocracies). What
we must rule out, however, is that (after conditioning on all our controls),
in the absence of the regime change, average growth in a "treated" coun-
try would have been the same as in the "control" countries. For instance,
we must rule out that transitions into democracy are enacted by far-sighted
leaders, who also have a lasting impact on economic growth, irrespective of
the regime change. Or conversely, that lapses into dictatorships are system-
atically correlated with a lasting deterioration of economic performance that
would have taken place even without the regime change.
In other words, identiﬁcation relies on absence of correlation between the
change in the unobserved determinants of growth before and after political
transitions, and the occurrence of transitions. A concrete example where this
could go wrong is the development in the former Communist regimes after
the fall of the Berlin Wall, where many of these states did not only change
their political regime, but also underwent a transformation towards a market
economy. Hence, as before, we include in xi,t the dummy variable for socialist
transitions after 1989 deﬁned in the previous subsection. We also continue
to control for transition years (now deﬁned as the year of transition plus the
year before and after), to check for the presence of an "Ashenfelter’s dip"
where growth is systematically lower at the time of democratic transitions,
because of the uncertainty and disruptions that surround regime changes.
The identifying assumption is made more credible by the presence in
equation (24) of the probability of autocracy ˆ pi,t. To see this, consider a
democracy that is widely (and correctly) expected to become an autocracy.
11See, for instance, Persson (2004), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005)
34This expectation leads to a deceleration of investment and growth well be-
fore the actual coup, so that very little happens to growth when the actual
regime change takes place. If we do not control for the increasing probability
of autocracy, we underestimate the beneﬁt of democracy (a downwards bias
in the estimate of φ). By the same argument in reverse, we would also un-
derestimate the beneﬁt of democracy if we failed to control for the expected
regime change, because the expectation of an upcoming uprise against autoc-
racy helps economic growth already before the fact. Hence, controlling for
the probability of autocracy should make identiﬁcation more credible, and
lead us to ﬁnd a stronger positive eﬀect of democracy on growth.
Identiﬁcation of parameter λ raises the same issues as in the prior sub-
section. Lack of time variation in the estimated hazard rates and hence, in
ˆ pi,t, raises another issue. Regime changes are rare events and, as shown in
Figure 4, the estimated hazard rates are generally small. This means that the
probability of autocracy in period t, ˆ pi,t, is strongly collinear not only with
lagged democracy, 1 − ai,t−1, but also with current democracy, 1 − ai,t. As a
result, it is diﬃcult to separately estimate the eﬀect of actual and expected
regime changes. Lack of time variation in the estimated hazard rates could
also reﬂect measurement error in our estimate of ˆ pi,t. If so, the measurement
error would end up in the residual of the growth equation (if λ is diﬀerent
from zero), aggravating to the identiﬁcation problem discussed above. Thus,
the problems of identiﬁcation and multicollinearity are related.12
6.2.2 Results
Table 5 reports the estimates of (24) on more than 8000 country years, when
we treat democracy as exogenous. Except for the displayed coeﬃcients, we
always include ﬁxed country and year eﬀects and control for foreign income,
wars, lagged wars and the indicator for formerly socialist countries in the
12An alternative, and more structural, approach would be to exploit the identifying as-
sumption that democratic capital determines growth only through actual (1 − ai,t) and
expected (￿ pi,t) regimes. This would mean estimating (24) by IV using both components
of democratic capital as instruments for current democracy. Since democratic capital also
enters the probability of autocracy through the hazard rates, we would achieve identiﬁca-
tion through an exclusion restriction (the eﬀect of democratic capital on growth is only
indirect, via actual and expected regimes), and a functional form restriction (the eﬀect of
democratic capital on expected regimes is fully captured by the non-linear function ￿ pi,t).
Given the strong correlation between (1 − ai,t) and ￿ pi,t noted above, such identiﬁcation
would be quite fragile, however, and we do not pursue it here.
35Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Aside from the
dummy variable for formerly socialist countries, the control variables are thus
identical to those in Table 3.
We start in column 1, by constraining λ to equal zero, thus omitting the
eﬀect of expectations of regime changes. The coeﬃcient on lagged income is
signiﬁcant, as before, while the coeﬃcient on transition years is negative, as
expected, and quite precisely estimated. The point estimate of φ, the impact
of democracy on growth, is positive and marginally signiﬁcant. This speciﬁ-
cation resembles that of existing empirical studies. From the perspective of
the model in this paper, however, such a speciﬁcation is doubtful. Indeed,
if expectations of regime changes also matter, omitting the probability of
autocracy may lead us to under-estimate the positive impact of democracy
on growth.
In columns 2 and 3, we drop democracy (1 − ai,t above) and instead
include the probability of autocracy (￿ pi,t above). As discussed in the previ-
ous section, the probability of autocracy was found to have diﬀerent eﬀects
depending on the regime (democracy or autocracy). Thus, to allow the coef-
ﬁcient of ￿ p to vary across regimes, we also interact ￿ pi,t with democracy in the
previous period (i.e., we add the variable ￿ pi,t   (1 − ai,t−1) to the regression),
with and without controlling for transition years. The estimates conﬁrm our
previous ﬁndings. The probability of autocracy hurts growth, and the eﬀect
is signiﬁcant in both regimes. But the risk of abandoning democracy has a
much stronger negative eﬀect on growth than the risk of remaining an au-
tocracy (although it is less precisely estimated in column 3 where transition
years are included)
The speciﬁcation in columns 2 and 3 remains doubtful, however, because
we have omitted the actual regime from the right-hand side. In columns 4 and
5 we thus report the results from a full speciﬁcation, including both actual
democracy (1−ai,t) and the probability of autocracy ￿ pi,t (alone and interacted
with lagged democracy),once more with and without transition years. The
coeﬃcient on democracy rises relative to columns 1 and 2, but is not quite
statistically signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.13 in column 5). The probability of
autocracy continues to exercise a negative eﬀect on growth, particularly in
democratic regimes.
The results in Table 5 are robust to measuring domestic democratic cap-
ital with a lower value of the depreciation rate (i.e., letting δ vary between
0.94 and 0.99), and to deﬁning democracy as in Boix and Rosato (2001).
They are also robust to including non-parametric growth trends for diﬀerent
36continents by interaction of indicators for years and continents (to allow for
geographic patterns of time variation in growth).
Altogether, the results in this and the previous subsection suggest that
becoming a democracy is associated with an average improvement in eco-
nomic performance. In terms of the model, the hypothesis that α > 0 is
supported by the within-country evidence. The results also suggest that al-
lowing for the expectations of regime change is not only interesting in its
own right, but could also play an important role in correctly assessing the
economic eﬀects of alternative regimes. The omission of these expectations
may be one reason why previous studies failed to detect a signiﬁcant growth
eﬀect from becoming a democracy.
6.3 Across regimes — reduced form
Drawing sharp inferences from Table 5 is diﬃcult because of multicollinearity
between actual and expected regimes, and the endogeneity of the actual
regime. To cope with both problems, we estimate a reduced form.
6.3.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
We start from the basic speciﬁcation:
yi,t − yi,t−1 = βyi,t−1 + π
zzi,t−1 + π
ffi,t−1 + γxi,t + αi + θt + ui,t . (25)
This equation can be derived from (18) in Section 3 by assuming log-linearity
(y being the log of per capita income), subtracting yi,t−1 from both sides,
replacing democratic capital dt−1 with its domestic and foreign components,
and allowing for an error term with speciﬁc country and year components
(in addition to white noise). The vector xi,t contains the same time-varying
controls as in the previous subsection.
Based on the theory, we expect a negative value for β — so that income
converges to a steady state ceteris paribus. The parameters of interest are
the coeﬃcients on democratic capital: πz, πf, which we expect to be posi-
tive. Under the exclusion restriction implied by the theory (that democratic
capital does not directly aﬀect investment) and the assumption that democ-
racies are more productive (α > 0), these coeﬃcients capture the sum of
two eﬀects that cannot be separately identiﬁed. As discussed in Section 3,
higher democratic capital increases the probability of democracy which raises
the expected return for investors in t − 1 which, in turn, leads to a higher
37(physical) capital stock and faster growth in period t. Higher probability of
democracy also raises yt directly on average, as democracy (and the resulting
higher TFP) occurs more often. Equation (25) can be consistently estimated
even if the exclusion restriction is violated — i.e., if democratic capital has a
direct eﬀect on growth, say, through policy formation — although this would
change the interpretation of the estimates.
The basic speciﬁcation leaves out the past regime ai,t−1, where theory
does not have any clear prediction. The major reason why at−1 enters (18) is
the regime-dependence of p∗
t (the probability of autocracy at t held at t−1).
Because democratic capital enters into p∗
t, we capture this non-linearity in the
reduced form by augmenting (25) with interaction terms, (1−ai,t−1) πzzi,t−1
and (1−ai,t−1) πffi,t−1, possibly with the addition of the lagged democracy
indicator (1 − ai,t−1).
6.3.2 Results
The results are reported in Table 6. Except for the coeﬃcients displayed in
the two tables, the speciﬁcation throughout Table 6 is identical to that in
Table 5.
Columns 1 and 2 report the simplest reduced-form speciﬁcation, with and
without transition years, and constraining the coeﬃcients of democratic cap-
ital to be the same under democracy and autocracy. Domestic democratic
capital has a positive and signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcient, as expected. For-
eign democratic capital, on the other hand, has a negative estimated coeﬃ-
cient not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Motivated by the earlier ﬁndings that political instability has diﬀerent
implications under democracy and autocracy, columns 3 and 4 allow the
coeﬃcients of democratic capital to diﬀer by lagged political regime (with
and without controls for transition years). Consistent with the results in
earlier tables, the positive eﬀect of democratic capital is only present among
those countries that were democracies in the previous period. Moreover,
now both the domestic and foreign components of democratic capital have a
positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on growth, as expected (although controlling
for transition years reduces the eﬀect of the foreign component of democratic
capital in column 4).
Finally, column 5 adds the lagged democracy indicator on its own. This
is more demanding on the data, because of collinearity (the correlation co-
eﬃcient between lagged democracy and domestic democratic capital is al-
38most 0.8). Nevertheless, the results in previous columns hold up pretty well.
Again, these ﬁndings support the hypothesis that becoming a democracy on
average leads to an improvement in TFP (in terms of the model, α > 0).
The point estimates implypowerful eﬀects of democratic capital on growth
and long-run income in democracy. Suppose we reconsider the experiments
discussed in Sections 5.2 and 6.1 above. Given the estimated convergence
rates and the estimated coeﬃcients of democratic capital reported in columns
3 to 5, a switch from 0 to 1, from minimum to maximum domestic democratic
capital, would raise long-run income in a democracy by more than 75%, and
a boost of foreign democratic capital by 0.4 units would raise long-run income
in a democracy by about 30%.
Once more, the results in Table 6 are robust to measuring democratic
capital with lower values of the depreciation rate δ, or to the inclusion of
non-parametric continental growth trends. Overall, these ﬁndings conﬁrm
that the positive eﬀect of democratic capital within democracies is reasonably
robust and quantitatively relevant. This in turn is evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that, on average, democracy has higher TFP than autocracy,
particularly in the group of countries that is more often under democratic
government.
7 Conclusions
What determines the onset and consolidation of democracy? We have high-
lighted the role of democratic capital. Being surrounded by well-functioning
democracies and having a long tradition of democratic rule is a major deter-
minant of democratic stability. According to the historical data (and in line
with earlier results by Przeworski et al, 2000), the risk to exit from democ-
racy goes down with the level of economic development, while development
does not seem to inﬂuence the probability of abandoning autocracy.
Does democracy inﬂuence the path of economic development? Our results
suggest that the expectations about future political regimes play an impor-
tant role. The risk of exit from democracy hurts economic growth. Taking
the probability of regime transition into account makes the positive growth
eﬀect of democracy more forceful. Moreover, through its eﬀect on the con-
solidation of democracy, democratic capital has a robust positive eﬀect on
growth. Altogether, these ﬁndings suggest that being a stable democracy is
an important positive factor to achieve more rapid economic development.
39These results point to a virtuous circle. Being a stable democracy favors
economic development which helps further consolidate democracy; this, in
turn, leads to the accumulation of more democratic capital, with additional
positive eﬀects on income and democratic stability. Getting into this virtuous
circle is diﬃcult, however, because democratic stability cannot be achieved
instantaneously.
Our inference is conditional on our identiﬁcation strategy, and hinges on
two assumptions. Domestic democratic capital is essentially a function of the
time spent under democracy in the (possibly distant) past. In attributing a
causal eﬀect to this component of democratic capital, we must assume that
no unobserved variables make some democracies more stable than others. We
have tested for speciﬁc random-eﬀect forms of this problem, and could not
reject absence of unobserved heterogeneity. A possible way of approaching
this issue is to think more imaginatively about the initial conditions for
domestic democratic capital in the year a country becomes independent.
The second important identifying assumption is that democratic capital
(domestic and foreign) does not directly aﬀect economic growth, conditional
on the covariates in the regression. This is more credible because our esti-
mates only exploit within country variation. Related to this, the eﬀect of the
expected probability of regime change on growth is identiﬁed only from the
time variation in the estimated hazard rates; the identifying assumption is
thus quite robust to prospective unobserved heterogeneity in the estimated
hazard rates. Moreover, the independent evidence from surveys in Section
4 and the statistical diagnostics in Section 6 suggest the assumption to be
valid.
Our empirical results point to a puzzling asymmetry between autocracies
and democracies. While higher income makes democracies more stable, it
does not make dictators more precarious. Moreover, while more instability of
democracy hurts growth, more instability of autocracy has a similar negative
eﬀect on growth (or no eﬀect in some speciﬁcations). A further asymmetry
is our ﬁnding that the positive inﬂuence of democratic capital on growth is
due to democracies, not to autocracies (even though the eﬀect of democratic
capital on political transitions is symmetric). One plausible interpretation
is that the social and political mechanisms that saw the seeds for successful
coups against democracies are diﬀerent fromthose that bring about successful
ousting of dictators. Another interpretation is that the average eﬀects we have
emphasized in this paper mask important diﬀerences between countries. If
so, it is important to uncover these heterogenous treatment eﬀects.
40In the light of these ﬁnal remarks, we see two prominent avenues for
future research. One priority would be to allow for more heterogeneity be-
tween countries. The task is easier for democracies, because we can exploit
a large literature in comparative politics that has studied a variety of demo-
cratic institutions, such as the electoral rule (majoritarian vs. proportional),
the form of government (presidential vs. parliamentary), and the degree of
centralization (federal vs. unitary). These forms of democracy may entail
diﬀerent degrees of political participation. If democratic capital accumulates
through active participation, its accumulation and depreciation rates may
systematically diﬀer across diﬀerent forms of democracy. But the empirical
ﬁndings suggest that understanding the diﬀerences between various types of
autocracies may be even more important.13
A related avenue for future research is to make more precise the notion of
democratic capital. Can we better understand just which values and norms
are essential and how these relate to cultural and sociological attitudes of
the population at large? How important is the contribution of education in
the accumulation of these values and norms? Does democratic consolidation
require the rise of a middle class with democratic values? Just how essential
are independent media in mobilizing support for democracy? Telling these
forces apart and more precisely pinpointing their speciﬁc roles in the process
of democratic capital accumulation is an important priority for further work.
13See here the analysis by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and the references they cite.
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The following is a list of the variables we use and their sources:
Africa: Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Africa,
0 otherwise.
Asia_middle east: Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country
is in the Middle East, 0 otherwise.
Current domestic democratic capital: Domestic democratic capital
accumulated during the current democratic spell. It equals 0 over autocratic
spells. Over democratic spells, the variable is equal to the diﬀerence between
the value of Domestic democratic capital in the current year and its value
at the end of the previous spell. Source: authors’ calculations on PolityIV
Project.
Democracy: Binary variable that captures the state of democracy of
country i in year t. This measure is deﬁned in two ways. In columns 1 to
4 of Table 2 and in Tables 3 and 6, Democracy is equal to 1 if the variable
polity2 in the PolityIV data set is strictly positive, and zero if polity2 is 0 or
negative. In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, the Democracy index is deﬁned as in
Boix and Rosato’s (2001) extension of the index constructed by Przerwoski
et al (2000). This deﬁnition emphasizes the turnover of political power in
fair and free elections, and is available from 1800 until 1994. Sources: Boix
and Rosato (2001); PolityIV Project.
Domestic democratic capital: Deﬁned by expression (19) in the
text, which ranges from 0 to 1. We calculated it for diﬀerent values of
the depreciation rate (1 − δ). For each country, the initial value (at the
year of independence or at the year 1800, whichever comes last) of domestic
democratic capital is assumed to be zero. Domestic democratic capital then
accumulates in years of democracy and depreciates geometrically, at a rate
(1 − δ), in years of autocracy. Source: authors’ calculations on PolityIV
Project.
Duration of current autocratic spell: deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the current year and the starting year of the current spell. Source: authors’
calculations on PolityIV Project.
Duration of current democratic spell: deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the current year and the starting year of the current spell. Source: authors’
calculations on PolityIV Project.
Esp_colony: Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is a former
Spanish colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
42Foreign Democratic Capital: Deﬁned by expression (20) in the text,
divided by 10, such that its value ranges from 0 to 1. It is the weighted
average of the continuous variable Polity2 in neighboring countries, taken
from the PolityIV data set (see Democracy). The weights correspond to the
distance between capitals. The index depends on the value of ρ, which iden-
tiﬁes the boundaries of what is considered neighborhood. In the regressions
showed in the text ρ = 1, i.e., all countries in the world are included in the
neighborhood. Sources: authors’ calculations on PolityIV Project.
Foreign income: Deﬁned by expression (23) in the text. It is a weighted
average of the log of real per capita output in the neighboring countries, with
weights equal to the distance between capitals. Source: Maddison (2001)
Government Anti Diversion Policies: Index of government’s anti-
diversion policies, measured over the period 1986-95. It is an equal-weighted
average of these ﬁve categories: i) law and order, ii) bureaucratic quality,
iii) corruption, iv) risk of expropriation and v) government repudiation of
contracts (each of these items has higher values for governments with more
eﬀective policies towards supporting production) and ranges from 0 to 1.
Source: Hall and Jones (1999).
Human capital: Years of schooling of the population above 25 years
of age. Annual measure constructed in Persson (2005) by interpolating the
ﬁve-year observations from Barro and Lee. Sources: Persson, 2005; Barro
and Lee, 2000
Initial constraints on the executive: Constraints in the executive in
the year of independence (source: Polity IV)
Initial democracy score: Polity2 score in the year of independence,
when democracy is deﬁned as polity2 > 0 (source: Polity IV). Dummy vari-
able equal to 1 if a democracy in the year of independence, when democracy
is deﬁned as in Boix and Rosato (2001).
More than ﬁve regime switches: Dummy variable equal to 1 for coun-
tries that had more than ﬁve regime switches between autocracy and dem-
coracy, or vice versa since independence.
Past domestic democratic capital: Democratic capital accumulated
over previous spells. For autocratic spells, the index is equal to the corre-
sponding value of Domestic democratic capital. For democratic spells, the
index is equal to the value of Domestic democratic capital at the end of the
previous spell, depreciating at a rate (1 − δ) over the current spell. Source:
authors’ calculations on PolityIV Project.
Per capita income: log of per real capita output adjusted for pur-
43chasing power parity. Source: Maddison (2001).
Period: linear time trend
Period Squared: quadratic time trend
Socialist legal origin: Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country’s legal
system has socialist origin, 0 otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999)
Socialist transition: Dummy variable equal to 1 after 1989 for former
socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Asian provinces of
the former Soviet Union
Thinks democracy is best: Index of individuals’ opinions on democracy,
deﬁned as the country average of the opinions on the statement "Democracy
may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government", as
expressed in the World Values Survey (WWS) data set on a 4 point scale,
from 1=strongly agree to 4=strongly disagree (question v163 in wave 3 and
4 of the survey). Missing and don’t know answers were dropped and the
average normalized, so that its value ranges from 0 to 1. Most observations
are from the fourth wave of the WWS, in 1999-2000. For a few countries,
data refer to the third wave, in 1995. Source: World Values Survey dataset
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/services/index.html)
UK_colony: Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is a former
British colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
War Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is at war over a certain
year, 0 otherwise. A war is deﬁned as any kind of war (internal or external).
Source: Correlates of War: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
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48Figure 1    Domestic democratic capital 
 
















































Figure 2  Foreign Democratic Capital
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 Table 1    Democratic capital and perceptions of democracy and of protection of property rights  
 































Domestic democratic capital  29.14***  42.93**  43.52***  46.22***  46.08***  4.35  2.79 
  (10.93)  (16.10)  (11.58)  (15.51)  (13.98)  (5.44)  (5.22) 
               
Foreign democratic capital  263.57**  345.63**  288.26  321.40**  396.89***  -61.76*  -49.29 
  (114.77)  (136.94)  (110.58)**  (131.83)  (128.84)  (32.93)  (32.18) 
               
Per capita income    -6.23    -2.29  -1.14  11.82***  9.36*** 
    (4.92)    (5.01)  (5.82)  (1.05)  (1.59) 
               
Democracy      -20.92***  -19.90**  -3.50  -0.07  -0.12 
      (7.77)  (8.34)  (9.42)  (2.30)  (2.50) 
               
Human capital          -19.87**    7.22** 
          (7.93)    (2.96) 
               
               
Number of observations  62  59  61  59  46  113  90 
Adj. R-squared  0.17  0.17  0.26  0.23  0.33  0.69  0.74 
 
Notes: Variables explained in text. All specifications estimated by Ordinary Least Squares. Standard errors in brackets:  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%.  All variables measured in 1999, except perception of government anti diversion policies, which is measured in 1997.  Table 2    Hazard rates out of political regimes 
 
 































             












             












             
δ,  ρ  0.94,  1  0.94,  1  0.99,  1  0.99,  1  0.97,  1  0.97,  1 
Covariates  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Def. of democracy  Polity4  Polity4  Polity4  Polity4  Boix-Rosato  Boix-Rosato 
Method  ML Probit  ML Probit  ML Probit  ML Probit  ML Probit  ML Probit 
LR-test (p-value)  0.00  0.11  0.37  0.14  1.00  0.44 
Number of observations  3848  4420  3786  4349  3969  4115 
Pseudo R-square  0.142  0.043  0.225  0.096  0.231  0.119 
 
Notes:  Variables explained in text.  Robust standard errors in brackets: * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
Covariates are indicators for wartime (current year and lagged year), socialist legal origin, British colonial origin, Spanish colonial origin, 
African location, Middle-Eastern location; in cols 3-4 , scores of democracy and constraints on the executive (both from Polity IV) in first year of 
independence, in cols 5-6, indicator for democracy (by Boix and Rosato) in first year of independence.  LR-test: random-effects panel 
specification (estimated by panel logit) against null of pooled specification (also estimated by logit) – a high p-value means we cannot reject that 
unobserved heterogeneity is absent. 
 Table 3    Hazard rates out of political regimes – auxiliary results  
 
























           







  (0.701) 
2.069*** 
  (0.455) 
           







  (0.076) 
0.004 
(0.068) 
           




     
Current democratic capital      -0.983** 
(0.400) 
   
Past democratic capital      -0.539 
(0.573) 
   




           
δ,  ρ  0.94,   1  0.94,  1  0.99,  1  0.99,  1  0.99,  1 
Covariates  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Definition of democracy  Polity  Polity  Polity  Polity  Polity 
Method  ML Probit  ML Probit  ML Probit  ML Probit  ML Probit 
LR-test (p-value)  0.24  0.05  1.00  1.00  0.00 
Number of observations  1947  1924  3786  3777  4329 
Pseudo R-square  0.22  0.06  0.23  0.23  0.12 
 
Notes:  Variables explained in text.  Robust standard errors in brackets:  * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.   Covariates are indicators for wartime (current and lagged year), socialist legal origin, British colonial origin, 
Spanish colonial origin, African location, Middle-Eastern location, a linear and a quadratic time trend, an indicator for countries that 
switched regime more than 5 times, polity2 scores of democracy and constraints on the executive in first year of independence.  LR-
test: random-effects panel specification (estimated by logit) against the null of pooled specification (also estimated by logit) – a high p-
value means we cannot reject that unobserved heterogeneity is absent. Table 4     Growth rates within political regimes – structural estimates  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Growth in democracies  Growth in democracies  Growth in autocracies  Growth in autocracies 
Hazard rate    - 12.20***                          
(4.56)  
 -12.31***                        
(4.55)    
 - 25.87*                         
(15.32)       
 - 26.94*                         
(15.77) 
Lagged income  per capita  -  4.32*** 
                   (0.61) 
- 4.41***           
(0.62) 




Transition years  - 0.81*                                
(0.48) 
-0.80*                                
(0.48) 
- 1.62***                          
(0.52) 
- 1.59***                             
(0.52) 
Domestic democratic capital 
 
1.75       
(1.62) 
  0.16                                     
(3.64) 
Foreign  democratic capital    
  - 4.46                              
(3.83) 
 
7.92                                                
(8.45) 
         
Sargan-Hansen statistic  2.18    1.01   
F-statistic     1.15    0.44 










 Adj. R-squared   0.20  0.20  0.12  0.12 
 
Notes: Variables explained in text.  Robust standard errors in brackets:  * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Democracy defined 
according to Polity IV. Hazard rates for democracies and autocracies computed from estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, respectively.  All specifications 
include country and year fixed effects and indicators for war years and lagged war years.  Columns 4 and 5 also include a dummy variable for years after 1989 in 
former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Asian provinces in the former Soviet Union. Sargan-Hansen statistic is computed as the number 
of observations times R-squared from regressing the residuals from the column on all included variables plus the excluded variables, namely domestic and foreign 
democratic capital.  F-statistic is the test statistic for the joint significance of the latter two variables.   Table 5     Growth rates across political regimes – structural estimates  
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Growth   Growth   Growth   Growth  Growth  
Democracy     0.40*                          
(0.22)  
    
0.64                     
(0.64) 
0.94                         
(0.62) 
Probability of autocracy    - 0.62**        
(0.31) 
- 0.49*        
(0.30) 
- 0.01                    
(0.77) 
 0.41                        
(0.62) 
Probability of autocracy 
in (lagged) democracy   
 - 5.92**                       
(2.63) 
 - 2.71                       
(2.66) 
  - 5.96**              
(2.61) 
 - 2.61                      
(2.65) 
Lagged income per 
capita  
- 2.88***                                  
(0.36) 
- 2.90***                                
(0.36) 
- 2.91***                                  
(0.36) 
- 2.90***                                  
(0.36) 
- 2.91***                                  
(0.36) 
Transition years  - 1.80***                         
(0.37)   
- 1.53***                         
(0.35) 
   - 1.61***                     
(0.35) 
       
 
 












 Adj. R-squared   0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14 
 
Notes: Variables explained in text.  Robust standard errors in brackets:  * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Democracy 
defined according to Polity 4. Probability of autocracy computed from hazard rates for democracies and autocracies as estimated in columns 3 and 4 of Table 
2, respectively.  All specifications include country and year fixed effects, indicators for war years and lagged war years, and an indicator for formerly socialist 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Asian provinces of the former Soviet Union after 1989.  Table 6     Growth rates across political regimes – reduced-form estimates  
 
   (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Growth   Growth   Growth  Growth   Growth  
Domestic democratic capital    3.34***                              
(1.08)  
 2.95***                              
(1.07)  
- 0.24                         
(1.63)  
-0.21                                
(1.63)  
- 0.64                               
(1.82)  
Foreign democratic capital  - 2.93                  
(3.36) 
- 2.79                  
(3.36) 
- 2.22                  
(3.55) 
- 1.92                 
(3.54) 
- 2.58                  
(3.60) 
Domestic democratic capital 
in (lagged) democracy     
  2.68**                         
(1.24)    
  2.40*                             
(1.23)    
  3.16**                               
(1.51)    
Foreign democratic capital 
in (lagged) democracy     
 2.61*                          
(1.39) 
 1.84                               
(1.31) 
  2.53*                            
(1.43) 
Lagged democracy 
       
-0.16                                
(0.29) 
Lagged income per capita   - 2.78***                                  
(0.36) 
- 2.81***                                  
(0.36) 
- 2.89***                                  
(0.37) 
- 2.90***                              
(0.37) 
- 2.89***                                  
(0.37) 
Transition years     -1.64***                  
(0.37) 
  - 1.47***                           
(0.35)   
           












 Adj. R-squared   0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14   0.14 
 
Notes: Variables explained in text.  Robust standard errors in brackets:  * denotes significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Democracy defined 
according to Polity 4.  Democratic capital variables computed with δ = 0.99 and ρ = 1.0, in consistency with the estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.  All 
specifications include country and year fixed effects, indicators for war years and lagged war years, and an indicator for formerly socialist countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Asian provinces of the former Soviet Union after 1989.   